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HMO'S, COST CONTAINMENT, AND EARLY
OFFERS: NEW MALPRACTICE THREATS
AND A PROPOSED REFORM
Jeffrey O'Connell* and James F. Neale**
Wall Street Journal columnist George Anders devotes the first thirteen
pages of his book, Health Against Wealth: HMOs and the Breakdown of
Medical Trust,1 to a Georgia couple directed over a "hotline"2 by a cost-
conscious health maintenance organization ("HMO")3 to drive their ail-
ing infant forty-two miles past numerous other hospitals to one at which
the HMO received a ten percent discount.' Because the child's men-
ingococcemia' was not immediately treated, physicians were forced to
amputate the child's feet and hands. Anders alleges that the delay was
unnecessary. A jury agreed, awarding the family a total of $45.5 million.6
The American health care system is changing dramatically.7 Accompa-
* Mr. O'Connell is the Samuel H. McCoy II Professor of Law at the University of
Virginia.. He holds a B.A. from Dartmouth College and a J.D. from Harvard University.
** Mr. Neale holds a B.A. from the University of Virginia and a J.D. from Harvard
University.
1. GEORGE ANDERS, HEALTH AGAINST WEALTH: HMOs AND THE BREAKDOWN
OF MEDICAL TRUST (1996).
2. Anders later notes that many health care providers refer to such utilization review
as "1-800-DENIAL" services, Id. at 64, "telephone triage," Id. at 132, and "remote control
medicire." Id.
3. An HMO is one example of a managed care organization and may be defined as
"an organized system of health care delivery for both hospital and physician services in
which care delivery and financing functions are offered by one organization." Vernellia R.
Randall, Managed Care, Utilization Review, and Financial Risk Shifting: Compensating Pa-
tients for Health Care Cost Containment Injuries, 17 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 1 (1993).
4. ANDERS, supra note 1, at 10.
5. Meningococcemia refers to the presence of bacteria in the blood that causes men-
ingitis or the inflammation of membranes surrounding the brain and spinal cord. Once
detectei, meningococcemia can be easily treated with antibiotics. But left unchecked, the
condition may be fatal. J.E. SCHMIDT, M.D., 4 ATTORNEY'S DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE
AND WORD FINDER 120-22 (1997).
6. The family accepted a significantly reduced amount when the HMO forfeited its
right to appeal. ANDERS, supra note 1, at 11.
7. For a thorough historical review of the American health care delivery system, see
John G. Day, Managed Care and the Medical Profession: Old Issues and Old Tensions, 3
CONN. INS. L. J. 1 (1996).
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nying these changes are new threats of malpractice. By definition, man-
aged care organizations ("MCOs") 8 impose cost-containment policies
upon the patients and providers with whom they contract. As Anders
correctly illustrates, these measures often have medical implications that
could give rise to malpractice claims.9 In addition to traditional medical
malpractice risks, HMO patients now face the risk of injury resulting
from financially motivated denial of treatment.
Generally speaking, the present malpractice system inadequately com-
pensates victims and fails to deter negligent providers.' 0 The system also
imposes tremendous transaction costs upon all concerned." The new
risks attendant to cost-containment policies reinvigorate the need for crit-
ical examination of our present malpractice system and its possible alter-
natives. This in turn provides an opportunity for legal scholars and
reformers to inquire whether an already distressed tort system should
bear the additional burden of resolving a rush of new malpractice claims
against HMOs or whether an alternative might better serve society. In
reviewing Anders' book, this Article details the new malpractice risks,
critiques the tort system's ability to address satisfactorily medical mal-
practice claims against HMOs, and suggests that an "early offer" compen-
sation scheme represents a much-needed reform for HMOs as well as
traditional malpractice claims.
I. THE NEW MALPRACTICE THREAT: A REVIEW OF Health
Against Wealth
In Health Against Wealth, Anders passionately, if not altogether con-
vincingly, alleges that for-profit HMOs systematically compromise mem-
8. Managed care is a comprehensive term "used to describe a variety of mechanisms
[including HMOs], ranging from reduced-price purchasing agreements with health care
providers to pre-authorization of facility admissions or surgical procedures." Carla Jensen
Hamborg, Medical Utilization Review: The New Frontier for Medical Malpractice Claims,
41 DRAKE L. REV. 113, 113 (1992). For a description of various MCOs, see Peter T.
Kilborn, Workers Getting Greater Freedom in Health Plans, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1997, at
At; see also VERGIL N. SLEE & DEBORAH ASLEE, HEALTH CARE TERMS (2nd ed.; 1991).
9. See also Thomas Bodenheimer, The HMO Backlash-Righteous or Reactionary,
335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1601 (1996) (describing criticism of HMOs). The first reported case
of a patient alleging negligent utilization review was Wickline v. State, 228 Cal. Rptr. 661
(Ct.App. 1986), appeal dismissed, 741 P.2d 613 (1987). However, HMOs, unlike fee-for-
service providers, are forced to internalize any future financial effects of malpractice their
patients might suffer. One could plausibly argue that this serves as an additional incentive
for HMOs to minimize any occurrences of medical malpractice.
10. PAUL C. WEILER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL (1991).
11. Id.
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bers' health to maximize profits. He argues that "medical commissars"'"
and "overseers who restrain what doctors can do" 3 reduce costs by ruth-
lessly enforcing medical utilization review' 4 and purchasing agreements, 5
Anders alleges that cost-containment policies have greatly restricted
providers' discretion, thereby undermining "compassion and the best as-
pects of American medical care ... in favor of a grim medical assembly
line that bounces patients along without any sensitivity to their unique
concerns."
16
The villains of Anders' work are HMO executives whom the author
describes as "barons of austerity"' 7 and "doctors in pinstripes... [with] a
raw hunger for wealth."' 8 Anders alleges that they "swagger in their new
prosperity ... pamper[ing] themselves with corporate jets, sleek black
limousines, and private chauffeurs." 9 He notes that their corporations
occupy "splendid suburban headquarters with landscaped grounds, wa-
terfalls., and big, bright work areas ... [as] lavish as those of comparable
Fortune 500 companies that [make] . . . cigarettes, missiles, or
motorcycles."
20
Subsidizing this unabashed greed is less costly and, Anders asserts, less
effective than medical treatment of individual patients. But beyond a
very few statistics,2 ' Anders presents little empirical data.22 Most of his
12. ANDERS, supra note 1, at 13.
13. Id. at x.
14. Medical utilization review is a "comprehensive evaluation of the efficiency, appro-
priateness, and medical necessity of health care." It may occur before, during, or after the
provision of health care. Hamborg, supra note 8, at 116. For a critical opinion of the now-
prevalent practice, see Jonathon Sharfstein, Who will Review the Managed Care Review-
ers?, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1997, at A20.
15. Purchasing agreements refer to contracts between the HMO and the health care
provider that impose mutual financial incentives. Normally, the HMO guarantees that its
member; will seek treatment from member providers in exchange for discounts for that
treatment. Randall, supra note 3, at 4.
16. ANDERS, supra note 1, at 42.
17. fd. at 55.
18. d. at 67.
19. .d. at 57.
20. id. at 63.
21. knders notes that the for-profit U.S. HealthCare spends only 70 percent of its
gross receipts on medical care while a non-profit like Kaiser Permanente typically spends
90-95 percent of its revenues on medical care. Id. at 62. He also cites surveys alleging that
20 percent of HMO members have been denied coverage for emergency treatment and
that 21 percent of HMO members in poor health were denied access to specialists within
the past year, compared to only 15 percent of comparable fee-for-service patients. Id. at
79. Anders also provides empirical data assessing cardiac surgery to support his assertion
that HMOs consistently contract for financial savings over medical efficiency, even when
1998]
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evidence, though emotionally compelling, is anecdotal. While academics
may criticize the work for lacking a more quantitative foundation, 23 An-
ders' novelistic approach is quite readable and is likely to arouse many
HMO patients, providers, and others.
Following the story of the Georgia child injured because his HMO
failed to deviate from its purchase agreement, Anders introduces his
readers to a series of other patients similarly injured by their HMOs'
cost-containment policies. Among the more notable is a patient suffering
from a blood-plasma disorder whose new HMO routinely denied him ac-
cess to the specialists who had previously treated him. A New York jury
awarded him more than $1 million. 24 Anders similarly recounts the sto-
ries of several HMO members suffering breast cancer who were denied
coverage for bone marrow transplants because their HMOs considered
the treatment "experimental." A California jury awarded the estate of
one of the women $89.1 million.25
These cases are compelling and well-told. However, they are an insuf-
ficient foundation upon which to universally condemn cost-containment
policies. In some cases, such policies admittedly prompt providers to
eliminate tests and procedures that may be desirable, or even necessary.
But Mr. Anders' grim picture conveys only part of the story. Cost-con-
tainment policies, at least arguably, have been quite successful in many
respects.2 6 In 1996, after the wide-scale adoption of managed care, em-
the less expensive center might have twice the mortality rate of its competitor. Id. at 93, 99-
103.
22. Most empirical studies contradict Anders' assertions, indicating that HMO-pro-
vided treatment is less costly and no less medically sound than treatment delivered under
the fee-for-service system. Clark C. Havighurst, Making Health Plans Accountable for the
Quality of Care, 31 GA. L. REV. 587, 593 (1997) (citing Robert H. Miller & Harold S. Luft,
Managed Care Plan Performance Since 1980: A Literature Analysis, 271 JAMA 1512, 1517
(1994).
23. See, e.g., Robert J. Samuelson, Mismanaged Care, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1996, at 13
("mass clinical studies don't yet show that managed care has systematically eroded qual-
ity"); see also Peter Phipps, Health Care Anecdotes Are Everywhere, But How About Some
Data? PROVIDENCE J. BULL., Oct. 27, 1996, at Ft.
24. ANDERS, supra note 1, at 80.
25. The parties agreed to a much lower amount when the HMO forfeited its right to
appeal. In this trial, a former employee of the HMO testified against her company after it
initially denied her coverage for similar treatment. Id. at 115. Following the case, the
California legislature required HMOs to cover bone marrow transplants in all basic health
plans. Id. at 129; see also CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 14133.8 (West 1991).
26. See, e.g., David Wessel, Health-Cost Trims Hold Inflation Down, WALL ST. J., June
30, 1997, at Al; but see David S. Hilzenrath, What's Left to Squeeze?, WASH. POST, July 6,
1997, at H1 (arguing that HMO cost-containment measures now approach the point of
diminishing returns).
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ployers' health care premiums rose less than 1 percent, whereas in 1991,
prior to the adoption of managed care, the increase had been 11.5 per-
cent.27 In 1996, the average managed care plan cost employers $3,305 per
employee compared to an average fee-for-service plan cost to employers
of $3,739 per employee.2" HMOs would seem a justified and, indeed,
predictable response to the grossly exorbitant fee-for-service 29 system
that they replaced. Under the fee-for-service system, providers had every
incentive to engage in, and insurers had little ability to contest, medically
unnecessary care.30 Managed care represents a response to the moral
hazard that necessarily accompanies any third-party payer system.31 In
denying coverage, HMOs effectively shift the financial burden of unnec-
essary treatment to patients and health care providers. 32 Because few
patients have the ability to incur these costs individually, providers must
either refrain from the treatment or provide it at their own expense.
Anders is certainly correct in noting that this shift creates the potential
for injury caused by the improper denial of coverage for treatment. But
he fails sufficiently to balance the risk of these injuries against the many
27. Samuelson, supra note 23, at 13.
28. Mike McNamee, Health Care Inflation, It's Baaack!, Bus. WK., Mar. 17, 1997, at
28.
29. Under a fee-for-service system, the insurer compensated the provider for every
instance of treatment an insured patient received. Thus, the patient receiving more treat-
ment offered the provider greater financial gains. For the view that providers' opposition
to HMOs is principally motivated by financial reasons, see Duncan Moore, Doctors Against
Profits (Sxcept Their Own), WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 1997, at A22. Even one commentator
critical of managed care euphemistically refers to the "fee-for-service" system as the "free-
lunch" system. Randall, supra note 3, at 86 n.45. Under a managed care system, in con-
trast, providers are often paid a "capitation fee" based on the number of patients who
subscribe to their services or a predetermined payment based on the diagnosed condition,
rather than payments for individual treatments actually rendered. Thus, the patient receiv-
ing less treatment offers the provider greater financial gains and, arguably at least, a
greater incentive to provide preventive care to keep the patient group healthier. See infra
note 35 and accompanying text.
30. Incentives under such a system are commonly referred to as presenting a "moral
hazard," encouraging the parties to engage in treatment that neither the provider nor the
patient, absent guaranteed reimbursement from a third party, would desire. Randall, supra
note 3, at 86 n.46 (citing Mark A. Hall & Ira Mark Ellman, HEALTH CARE LAW AND
ETHIcs 8 (1990)).
31. See generally PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
MEDICINE (1982). For a much more extensive discussion of alleged waste and fraud in
Medicare billing and payment (normally under modified fee-for-service, not HMOs), see
Robert Pear, Audit of Medicare Finds $23 Billion in Overpayments, N.Y.TIMES, July 17,
1997, at Al.
32. Randall, supra note 3, at 30.
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benefits achieved by HMOs. HMOs have reduced medical costs33 by
eliminating automatic payment for unnecessary procedures,3 4 discourag-
ing over-utilization of emergency rooms,31 and imposing administrative
discipline on "M.D.-ieties ',36 that were previously beyond reproach. Pro-
ponents of managed care argue that national standards have improved
the quality of care patients receive and that the financial incentives of
HMOs have increased the prevalence of preventative medicine. 37 It is
likely that cost-containment measures will continue at the behest of em-
ployers, because health care expenses now represent the largest single
component cost of American manufacturing.38 Because of the successes
employers perceive, and an apparent lack of other viable alternatives,"
33. One study of 222 employers noted that utilization review programs reduced cost
by an average of 8.3 percent. Glenn Ruffenback, Employers Can Cut Health Care Costs
with "Utilization Review," Study Finds, WALL ST. J., May 19, 1988, at A38. Although it is
commonly asserted that HMOs have already achieved most of the sayings they are capable
of, see, e.g., Spencer Rich, Open Season: Health-Care Premiums are Going Up, WASH.
POST, Nov. 11, 1997, at 16, of a special "Health" supplement (see also Hilzenrath, supra
note 26, at HI). For a contrary view that they will continue to decrease health care costs by
discouraging technical innovation in health care delivery, see David Vessel, Health Cost
Trims Hold Inflation Down, WALL ST. J., June 30, 1997, at Al. Of course such a role could
lead to its own excitement of malpractice claims.
34. Randall, supra note 3, at 86, n.107, (stating a 1988 study concluded that nearly 10
percent of Medicare admissions were not medically justifiable).
35. Some HMOs boast of reducing emergency room treatment by as much as 40 per-
cent. See generally Laurence C. Baker & Linda Schuurman Baker, Excess Cost of Emer-
gency Department Visits for Nonurgent Care, 13 HEALTH AFAIRS 162, 170 (Winter, 1994)
(estimating that the nationwide cost of excess emergency treatment was between five and
seven billion dollars in 1993).
36. ANOERS, supra note 1, at 23.
37. See, e.g., Peter T. Kilborn, Doctors Organize to Fight Corporate Intrusion, N.Y.
TIMES, July 1, 1997, at A12; see also Lloyd M. Krieger, Doctors and Divided Loyalties,
WASH. POST, Jan. 22, 1998, at A21 (lauding managed care for promulgating uniform stan-
dards and systemic data).
38. Chris Snowbeck, Health Care Professionals Learning Business Aspect of Their
Field, CHARLOTTESVILLE DAILY PROGRESS, Apr. 13, 1997, at Al.
39. Though some commentators herald Medical Savings Accounts ("MSAs") as a via-
ble alternative both politically and economically, See, e.g., Bruce A. Barron, The Price of
Managed Care, 103 COMMENTARY 49, 52 (1997); see, e.g., Edward M. Kennedy & Richard
A. Gephardt, Messing With Medicare, WASH. POST, June 26, 1997, at A19; see also John
Judis, Careless, THE NEW REPUBLIC, July 28, 1997, at 14; see generally, Kilborn, supra note
37, at A12 (discussing providers and medical school professors thoughts on alternatives to
HMOs). For an indication of the frustration of HMOs in attempts to further reduce health
care costs (quite apart from mandates to increase benefits-see infra notes 144-52) con-
sider the following:
In some cities, hard-bargaining health plans are paying a price for creating a sense
of panic among rival hospitals and inspiring them to consolidate. Where HMOs
and Preferred Provider Organizations once held the upper hand in negotiations,
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managed care seems here to stay. It has, as Anders notes, become "the
de facto national health policy of the United States."4
Americans place three competing demands on their health care system.
They seek to expand coverage and to control costs, to preserve the indi-
vidual autonomy and the quality of care that characterized the fee-for-
service system.41 Unfortunately, the three goals directly conflict with one
another. Any substantial effort to control costs threatens to reduce ac-
cess, autonomy, or quality of care. As one editorial stated, "[alt some
point a. cap on price becomes a cap on care."4 Conversely, any substan-
tial effort to increase access, autonomy, or quality of care threatens to
raise health care costs. However, Anders never explicitly recognizes,
much less reconciles, this obvious tension. His work vividly and capably
illustrates the possible adverse effects of allocating care with limited re-
sources, but it provides little practical assistance for making those alloca-
tions, or for assessing the social utility of cost-containment measures.
After discounting market,43 regulatory,44 and political45 safeguards,
the merged hospitals now wield increased market clout, making it easier for them
to raise prices or resist price cuts, health care analysts and executives say.
David S. Hilzenrath, Nation's Hospitals the Picture of Health, WASH. PosT, Feb. 7,1998, at
Hi.
40. ANDERS, supra note 1, at 244.
41. Samuelson, supra note 23, at 13.
42. Health Care Heavies, WASH. PosT, Feb. 28, 1997, at A20. See also George Anders
& Ron Winslow, HMOs Woes Reflect Conflicting Demands of American Public, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 22, 1997, at Al.
43. Anders doubts that market safeguards offer any protection for HMO members.
Patients have little opportunity to bargain with HMOs because they have so much invested
in their jobs and there is no real exit option. See generally ANDERS, supra note 1, at 246-62.
44. d. at 230. (stating the internal review organization established by HMOs in the
1970s approved every managed care plan it reviewed) ANDERS, supra note 1, at 230. (argu-
ing that physician members are ineffective critics because HMOs have employed legal and
financial incentives (so-called "gag rules") to keep their member providers from com-
plaining about poor quality either to patients or press). Id. at 80. While state regulators
purport to provide at least minimal protection, Anders characterizes them as inept, com-
promised, and understaffed. California, for instance, assigned only two full-time regulators
to review all HMO member complaints within the state. Id. at 231 (citing Michael A.
Hiltzik & David R. Olmos, The Health Care Revolution, Remaking Medicine in California,
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1995, at Al).
45. ANDERS, supra note 1, at 212 (arguing politicians are likely to focus only on vote-
winning and "superficial" strategies-guaranteeing 48-hour hospital stays instead of less
expensive "drive-through deliveries"). They are also arguably unlikely to impose whole-
sale referms upon the industry because they are dependent upon managed care to reduce
cost increases in entitlement programs like Medicare and Medicaid. Cathy L. Burgess,
Comment, Preferred Provider Organizations: Balancing Quality Assurance and Utilization
Review, , J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y, 275, 291-92 (1988); see also, infra notes 144-54
and accompanying text.
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Anders makes ten specific recommendations designed to "bring better
human judgment into the system. ' '4 6 Here, perhaps, his work is least per-
suasive of all. Following thirteen chapters of vehement criticism, his "so-
lutions" often amount to little more than a dignified surrender. He urges
regulators to "patrol the ways that HMOs pay doctors; '4 7 doctors to "es-
tablish better report cards on the quality of health plans;"48 and members
to "know how to file effective complaints. ' 49 But finally-and most cru-
cially-Anders argues that abusive cost-containment policies should be
subjected to "the spotlight" of tort liability.5°
II. THE "SPOTLIGHT" OF TORT LIABILITY
Ideally, civil liability should fully compensate injured patients and ade-
quately deter negligent providers without affecting the behavior of non-
negligent providers. But contrary to Anders' suggestion regarding the
curative effects of our tort system, evidence strongly suggests that medical
malpractice tort law is grossly ineffective in these regards. Research sug-
gests that few victims of medical negligence file a lawsuit, and that the
substantial majority of malpractice suits actually filed have no basis in
medical fact.51 The most widely cited source from a Harvard interdisci-
plinary study suggests that only one in eight negligently injured plaintiffs
files a tort claim, and that only one in sixteen is eventually compen-
sated.52 One source reports that one half of plaintiffs' attorneys saw little
or no evidence of malpractice in more than fifty percent of their cases.53
These figures strongly suggest that our fault-based, adversarial tort sys-
tem fails to compensate deserving injured patients, fails to deter negligent
providers, and adversely affects non-negligent providers.
In sum, our current tort system is ill-equipped to resolve either tradi-
46. ANDERS, supra note 1, at 246-62.
47. Id. at 251.
48. Id. at 258.
49. Id. at 256.
50. Id.
51. Early Offers Could Cut Malpractice Suits, Speed Payouts to Injured, Analyst Says,
BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, DAILY REPORT FOR EXECUTIVES, Nov. 25, 1996, at A-25.
52. Harvard Medical Malpractice Study: Patients, Doctors, and Lawyers: Medical In-
jury, Malpractice Litigation, and Patient Compensation in New York, A Report by the
Harvard Medical Practice Study to the State of New York, Harvard College (1990).
53. Michael B. Van Scoy-Mosher, An Rx for the Malpractice Explosion, L.A. TIMES,
June 28, 1983, at 4 (reviewing D. FLASTER, MALPRACTICE: A GUIDE TO THE LEGAL
RIGHTS OF PATIENTS AND DOCTORS (1983)).
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tional medical malpractice claims or those filed against HMOs.5 4 Part III
of this Article breaks the problem down into three parts. First, it de-
scribes the tort system's compensatory shortcomings. Next, the section
details the tort system's deterrent shortcomings. Then it reveals the enor-
mous transaction costs imposed by the tort system. The final section of
Part III illustrates the reasons that these inadequacies are particularly
acute in malpractice claims against HMOs.
A. Compensation
Harvard Law School Professor Paul Weiler, a senior author of the
Harvard study just mentioned, lamented that:
[v'liewed as a form of insurance, the malpractice regime has ma-
jor flaws .... [t]ort benefits are doled out in a rather arbitrary
manner to some-but not most-deserving victims, and also to
those ... who are not even 'deserving' under tort law's fault-
based frame of reference.55
Others have similarly described the negligently-injured plaintiff's chance
of recovery as speculative and "lottery-like."56 One recent study pub-
lished in the New England Journal of Medicine indicates that a plaintiff's
degree of disability, rather than a provider's negligence, is most signifi-
cantly statistically correlated with tort recovery.57 Such evidence under-
standably prompts criticism of the tiresome, expensive, and punishing
show of casting blame when the assignment of "fault" appears to be
largely a charade, irrelevant to litigation results.
Even the "fortunate" few who are fully compensated are not likely to
be adequately remunerated for their full economic losses: up to forty
percent of any plaintiff's award is immediately diverted to attorney's fees,
regardless of the attorney's investment in or the complexity of the case. 8
Additionally, the average medical malpractice tort claim takes over eight-
54. Despite the criticism offered herein, many still support the tort system. See, e.g.,
Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093 (1996).
55. Paul C. Weiler, The Case for No-Fault Medical Liability, 52 MD. L. REv. 908, 915
(1993).
56. David S. Starr, The No-Fault Alternative to Medical Malpractice Litigation: Com-
pensation, Deterrence, and Viability Aspects of a Patient Compensation Scheme, 20 TEX.
TECH L. REV. 803, 806 (1989).
57. Troyen A. Brennan, Colin M. Sox & Helen R. Burstin, Relation Between Negligent
Adverse Events and the Outcomes of Medical-Malpractice Litigation, 335 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1963, 1966 (1996).
58. Starr, supra note 56, at 806-07 n.23; see also Murray L. Schwartz & Daniel J.B.
Mitchell, An Economic Analysis of the Contingent Fee in Personal Litigation, 22 STAN. L.
REV. 1125 (1970) (noting that the contingent fee represents the greatest single cost for the
19981
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een months to settle or adjudicate 59-a time during which injured plain-
tiffs' financial needs may be most acute, but during which any pecuniary
recovery under tort law is denied.6 °
B. Deterrence
In addition to compensating malpractice victims in an unpredictable
and inadequate manner, the tort system inefficiently deters providers. A
punitive system must accurately and fairly assess liability in order to deter
potential wrongdoers without affecting the behavior of non-negligent
providers. In contrast to this ideal, Troyen Brennan, a lawyer and a pro-
fessor at both Harvard's Medical and Law Schools, compared the tort
system to "giving tickets to a lot of people who weren't speeding, but
letting a lot of speeders go by.",61 Because the tort system fails to assess
liability accurately, it over- and under-deters providers, prompting many
to question the system's efficacy in deterring negligent care.
62
The lack of claims in tort law results in substantial under-deterrence.
In other words, numerous false negatives, or instances that warrant liabil-
ity but none is found, occur. Problems of under-deterrence are com-
pounded by two other factors. First, even the most deserving tort
judgment is substantially delayed, thereby attenuating the chronological
connection between the negligent act and the eventual "punishment.
' 63
Second, the deterrent effect on most tort defendants is decreased because
almost all are indemnified by insurers.64 Malpractice insurance is priced
by specialty and location, rather than by individual merit rating, thereby
plaintiff). Of course, the defendant, win or lose, is forced to expend substantial resources
on attorneys' fees.
59. S.Y. Tan, Comment, The Medical Malpractice Crisis: Will No-Fault Cure the Dis-
ease? 9 U. HAW. L. REV. 241, 243 n.13 (1987) (noting also that 10 percent of medical
malpractice cases remain open for over six years).
60. But see Section II, Subsection D infra (asserting that the HMO-member plaintiff
may be in a relatively favorable situation in this regard).
61. JEFFREY O'CONNELL & C. BRIAN KELLY, THE BLAME GAME, INJURIES, INSUR-
ANCE AND INJUSTICE 131 (1987).
62. Susan Okie, What Wins Malpractice Cases?, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 1997, at Z07
(quoting Troyen Brennan, supra note 57, "I think there's very little evidence of the deter-
rent effect of tort litigation").
63. Arthur B. Laby & W. Hardy Callcott, Patterns of S.E.C. Enforcement under the
1990 Remedies Act. Civil Money Penalties, 58 ALB. L. REV. 5, 52 (1994) (applying the same
argument in securities regulation).
64. Josephine Y. King, No Fault Compensation for Medical Injuries, 8 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 227, 227 (1992) (noting that "protection [from liability] through in-
demnification has stunted, blunted, or obliterated a fear" of liability); see also Peter A.
Bell, Legislative Intrusions into the Common Law of Medical Malpractice: Thoughts about
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muting the financial deterrence normally combatting an insured's negli-
gent behavior.65 As HMOs are exposed to more liability, they similarly
insulatc: themselves with unprecedented levels of liability insurance.
66
Evidence of tort law's under-deterrence is perhaps most convincingly
offered by courts themselves. In refusing to impose liability upon an
HMO for the negligent denial of care, a federal appeals court noted that
liability would have only a mild "salutary effect of deterring poor-quality
medical decisions.,
67
To the extent the tort system does deter, it may well over-deter non-
negligent providers. Studies suggest that "pain and suffering" damages
are determined as much by bias and whim as by evidence or analysis.68
Because potential malpractice defendants perceive themselves vulnerable
to the arbitrary imposition of "irrational [and] illogical"69 pain and suffer-
ing damages, regardless of their own negligence, they are arguably over-
deterred. Such over-deterrence is commonly referred to as "defensive
medicine.",71 In an effort to insulate themselves from even a remote pos-
sibility of tort liability, providers may rely upon unnecessary tests and
the Deterrent Effect of Tort Liability, 35 SYR. L. REV. 939, 954 (1984) (stating that insurance
"eviscerates the economic sanction that tort liability presents against medical negligence").
65. Bell, supra note 64, at 955 (asserting that "a doctor must be aware that so long as
he purchases malpractice insurance, he need not worry about the economic consequences
of his negligent medical behavior"); see also Wyckoff, The Effects of a Malpractice Suit
Upon Physicians in Connecticut, 176 JAMA 1096, 1098-99 (1961) (reporting that of 58
physicians sued in Connecticut, 52 said that the suit did not affect their practice, one said
that it negatively affected her practice, and five said that it positively affected their
practice).
66. Uneasy HMOs Boost Liability Limits, 22 MED. LIABILITY MONITOR 4 (1997).
67. Corcoran v. United Health Care, 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506
U.S. 1033 (1992). Note that the judiciary similarly discounts tort law's deterrent effect in
exempting itself from tort liability. See, e.g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (pro-
viding judicial immunity from civil liability). See also Jeffrey O'Connell & Ralph M.
Muoio, The Beam in Thine Eye, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 491 (1997).
68. See, e.g., Richard Morin, Beauty and the Beast in the Courtroom, WASH. POST,
Nov. 30, 1997, at C5 (describing study which suggests the parties' physical attractiveness,
race, and. gender helps to determine civil and criminal cases). See also Henson Moore &
Jeffrey O'Connell, Foreclosing Medical Malpractice Claims by Prompt Tender of Economic
Loss, 44 LA. L. REv. 1267, 1268 (1984) (arguing that female plaintiffs receive more in pain
and suffcring damages than do males, and older plaintiffs receive more than younger
plaintiffs).
69. King, supra note 64, at 235.
70. See Study Finds Direct Tort Reforms Could Cut Defensive Medicine, Pare Medical
Costs, MED. LIABILITY MONITOR, Feb. 21, 1997, at 6 (citing a study by David Kessler and
Mark McClellan of Stanford University and the National Bureau of Economic Research,
which estimated that tort reforms might lead to savings of $50 billion per year in defensive
medicine costs without adversely affecting the quality of health care).
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procedures to preclude any possibility of a "false positive," a finding of
liability where none is warranted. In other words, the uncertainty of tort
law prompts providers routinely to provide treatment for legal rather
than medical reasons. 71 A recent study focusing on defensive medicine
co-authored by a physician and an economist suggests that nationwide
tort reform could produce savings of $50 billion a year without serious
adverse health-care consequences.72 In addition to such "positive" costs
of defensive medicine, over-deterrence might also result in "negative"
costs. Examples include providers' unwillingness to perform a difficult or
experimental procedure,73 or even their early retirement.74
C. Unnecessarily High Transaction Costs
In addition to inadequate compensation and inefficient deterrence, the
tort system imposes enormous transaction costs upon all parties. These
costs are perhaps nowhere more evident than in medical malpractice
cases. Harvard's Troyen Brennan estimates that sixty cents of every dol-
lar paid in malpractice insurance premiums is expended on "administra-
tive costs of malpractice suits: lawyers' fees, court fees, medical experts,
and other associated Costs." '75 Other studies suggest that the figure may
be as high as seventy-two cents.76 In addition to these financial costs, the
psychological costs tort litigation imposes upon plaintiffs,77 as well as
providers,78 are well documented. Neuropsychiatrist Lester Keiser re-
ports that "the nervous strain experienced by a [negligence] ... victim is
71. Armand Leone, Jr., As Health Care Enterprise Liability Expands... Is ADR the
RX for Malpractice?, 49 Disp. RESOL. J. 7, 10 (1994); see also Laurence R. Tancredi, De-
signing a No-Fault Alternative, 49 J. L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 277, 279 (1986) (citing AMA
Study Reports Sharp Increase in Malpractice Claims Against Physicians, Med. Liab. Advis.
Service, Jan. 1980, at 16); see also Brinkley, AMA Study Finds Big Rise for Claims in Mal-
practice, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1985, at Al.
72. Daniel Kessler & Mark McClellan, Do Doctors Practice Defensive Medicine?, Q. J.
OF ECON., May 1996, at 353.
73. See, e.g., Jennifer O'Sullivan, Medical Malpractice, CRS Report for Congress, Jan.
28, 1997, at 5 (citing an American College of Obstetrician and Gynecologists ("ACOG")
survey which reported that one quarter of members decreased high-risk obstetrical care
because of fear of tort liability).
74. Moore & O'Connell, supra note 68, at 1270; see also O'Sullivan, supra note 73, at 5
(citing ACOG study indicating that 12.3 percent of members gave up obstetrics in 1992
because of fear of tort liability); Roger Rosenblatt, Why do Physicians Stop Practicing
Obstetrics?: The Impact of Malpractice Claims, 76 OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY 245
(1990).
75. Okie, supra note 62, at Z07.
76. O'CONNELL & KELLY, supra note 61, at 127.
77. Starr, supra note 56, at 806-07 n.23.
78. Leone, supra note 71, at 10 n.18.
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often intensified in the ensuing wrangles with claim adjusters and lawyers
.... [Some plaintiffs] become so absorbed in nursing their symptoms and
pressing their claims that they completely alter their lives."'7 9
It is often extremely difficult for any expert to engage in post-proce-
dure analysis of complex medical treatment and to identify and isolate an
allegedly negligent act. It is arguably even more difficult for laypersons
to reconcile competing experts' opinions regarding these complexities.8s
Yet, this is exactly the task our current tort system delegates to civil ju-
ries. While it may be within the ken of a jury to determine the negligence
of an automobile driver (a determination that at least requires jurors to
draw from their own common and routine experience), asking the jury to
determine the competence and consequences of complex medical proce-
dures i.s an infinitely greater task. Because these matters are so complex
and unpredictable, even skilled and experienced plaintiffs' attorneys liti-
gating a particular case are rarely entirely confident of the validity or
value of their clients' claims."' (How else could a plaintiff's attorney jus-
tify charging a contingent fee of a third or more?)
In an action against an HMO for negligent cost containment, the jury's
task might be even more difficult than in a typical malpractice case, in
that the jury is required to determine the complexities of advanced and
often experimental medical treatment and at the same time resolve com-
plicated financial and ethical dilemmas. Only after determining the sav-
ings produced by a particular cost-containment measure would the jury
be in an appropriate position to determine whether the injury in the in-
stant case was the result of improper care-assuming we can expect ju-
rors to be this objective about such emotional matters.8s
These complexities impose heavy transaction costs upon all parties to
medical malpractice litigation. The billions of dollars expended on mal-
practice insurance premiums each year do not usually include the increas-
ing resort to self insurance by large health care providers.8 3 High-risk
specialists in states like New York and Florida pay annual malpractice
79. O'CONNELL & KELLY, supra note 61, at 133-34.
80. But see generally, Neil Vidmar, Empirical Evidence on the Deep Pocket Hypothesis:
Jury Awards For Pain and Suffering in Medical Malpractice Cases, 43 DUKE L.J. 217 (1993).
For a somewhat critical review of Vidmar's book, see Jeffrey O'Connell & Christopher
Pohl, forthcoming in J.L. & HEALTH.
81. O'CONNELL & KELLY, supra note 61, at 131-32.
82. Randall, supra note 3, at 34.
83. O'Sullivan, supra note 73, at 1.
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premiums of up to $200,000.84 During one recent three-year period, an-
nual medical malpractice premiums jumped 150 percent,85 limiting prov-
iders' ability to effectively pass these costs on to the consuming public.
Most malpractice litigation expenses are related to two identifiable issues:
determining fault and ascertaining the amount of "pain and suffering"
damages.86 Though available elsewhere, exorbitant pain and suffering
damages may occur with greater frequency in malpractice suits (where
they constitute about half of total damages87) because malpractice jurors,
contrary to jurors in an automobile case, will not expect to directly bear
increased premiums as a result of their award to the plaintiff.88 Research-
ers estimate the median jury award for a leg amputation in an automobile
case to be $199,999, while the same injury in a malpractice case warrants
$754,000.89
D. HMO Malpractice and the Tort System's Inadequacies
Having detailed the general inadequacies of the tort system, this sec-
tion of the Article illustrates the particular inadequacies of the tort sys-
tem as evident in a malpractice claim against an HMO. Patient-
employees allegedly injured by their HMO's negligence are likely guaran-
teed continuation of their medical coverage and of at least a portion of
wages through employment-provided sick leave or disability insurance.
Because the tort system is so expensive and cumbersome, or because
sometimes even prevented by law from doing so, collateral sources of
payment may not subrogate themselves to the plaintiff's malpractice
claim. Claimants often, in other words, recover twice for incurring medi-
cal costs, once from the defendant and once from a collateral source.90
Finally, the plaintiff's eventual recovery consists largely of "pain and suf-
fering damages" which, data suggests, are often derived by multiplying
economic, or empirically demonstrable, losses such as medical bills9 (for
84. Stephen D. Sugarman, Doctor No, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1499 (1991) (reviewing
PAUL C. WEILER, MEDICAL MALPRACrICE ON TRIAL (1991)).
85. 1 American Law Institute, Reporter's Study, Enterprise Responsibility for Per-
sonal Injury 3 (1991).
86. Joseph H. King, Jr., The Exclusiveness of an Employee's Workers' Compensation
Remedy Against his Employer, 55 TENN. L. REV. 405, 412 (1988).
87. Vidmar, supra note 80, at 222.
88. Weiler, supra note 84, at 48.
89. Vidmar, supra note 80, at 219-20.
90. Kenneth Abraham & Lance Liebman, Private Insurance, Social Insurance, and
Tort Reform: Toward a New Vision of Compensation for Illness and Injury, 93 COLUM. L.
REV. 75, 96 n.8 (1993).
91. Jeffrey O'Connell, A Proposal to Abolish Defendants' Payments for Pain and Suf-
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which the plaintiff, to reiterate, is not directly responsible). Potential
plaintiffs, therefore, are often insulated from any immediate financial
need by health insurance and sick leave or disability insurance. This insu-
lation is reinforced by an aggressive trial bar, which because of the con-
tingent- fee system, demands no upfront financial investment by a
claimant to bring a medical malpractice suit. This system creates a mani-
fest incentive to initiate and inflate medical malpractice claims, especially
against an HMO, which by definition, only deals with patients for whom
health care costs are already provided. "Nowhere in the world is there
anything remotely comparable to the incentives to incur wasteful health
care costs '' 92 as in America.
The present malpractice system, then, is inadequate in numerous ways.
Given the opportunity, it is extremely doubtful that the majority of health
care consumers, providers, or insurers would opt for the current system.
Considering its inadequate compensation, deterrence, and high transac-
tion costs, one might expect many to join Professor Patrick Atiyah in pre-
dicting that "in fifty years time people will look back with some horror on
tort law as [having thrived] ... too long.",93 As our health care delivery
system undergoes the substantial change engendered by managed care,
and as patients are arguably exposed to new threats of malpractice, it is in
everyone's interest, except perhaps some lawyers, to seek a better system
of compensation and deterrence.
III. THE LIKELIHOOD OF INCREASED MALPRACTICE LITIGATION
AGAINST HMOs
Having acknowledged that Anders is correct in noting the potential for
injury created by harmful cost-containment policies, and having illus-
trated tort law's deficiencies in traditional malpractice claims, Part III of
this Article examines several factors that will substantially increase "new"
medical malpractice claims-those against HMOs for the negligent denial
fering in Return for Payment of Claimants' Attorneys' Fees, 1981 U. ILL. L. REV. 333,334-39
(1981); s ee also Peter Bell & Jeffrey O'Connell, Accidental Justice 191 (1997). Senator
Mitch N/IcConnell estimates that excess medical claims connected to lawsuits in which pain
and suffering damages were at issue may total $4 billion annually. 142 CoNo. REC. S6082,
6097, 104th Cong., 2d Sess., June 11, 1996.
92. Jeffrey O'Connell, Blending Reform of Tort Liability and Health Insurance: A
Necessary Mix, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1303, 1309 (1994).
93. O'CONNELL & KELLY, supra note 61, at 133. But for a graphic portrayal of the
increase in the number of those uninsured for health care from 1987 through 1996, see Milt
Fruedenheim, Progress on Health Care Costs, But Nagging Woes Persist, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
5, 1998, at CI0.
1998]
302 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 14:287
of treatment. First, the growth of managed care would mean that more
individuals gain coverage for medical treatment.94 Empirical data dem-
onstrates that increasing access to health care insurance in any form re-
sults not in fewer malpractice claims, but in commensurate, or even
disproportionate, increases in tort litigation and costs. 95 As private and
social loss-shifting insurance systems expand, tort liability, ironically
enough, appears to consume increasingly large proportions of all avail-
able insurance funds. 96 Second, procedural barriers that historically have
impeded plaintiffs injured by employment-provided health care plans are
rapidly eroding.
97
Criticism of HMOs, both measured 98 and sensational, is certain to in-
crease concern over the quality of HMO-delivered health care.99 Recent
allegations of fraudulent over-billing, both criminal1° ° and otherwise, 1 '
are nearly certain to increase public animosity toward HMOs. These un-
flattering portrayals are also likely to increase the frequency and severity
of malpractice claims levied against HMOs.' 2 As these accounts prolif-
erate, so will advertisements and other efforts from attorneys likely to
benefit from malpractice claims.'0 3 In addition, the general dissatisfac-
94. See, e.g., R. Winslow, HMOs are Expected to Deliver Strong Profit Growth, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 17, 1994, at B4; see also M. Mitka, HMO Industry Stabilizes, Diversifies, Enroll-
ment Up, AM. MED. NEWS, July 19, 1993, at 7. Of course, negative portrayals and reason-
able criticism of the managed care industry may temper such optimistic projections. See,
e.g., Peter Passell, In Medicine Government Rises Again, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1997, at 1.
95. See, e.g., O'Connell, supra note 92, at 1304-05.
96. Id.
97. See generally L. Frank Coan, Jr., Note, You Can't Get There From Here-Ques-
tioning the Erosion of ERISA Preemption in Medical Malpractice Against HMOs, 30 GA.
L. REV. 1023 (1996).
98. See, e.g., Consumers and Managed Care, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1997, at A14.
99. See Peter T. Kilborn, Trend Toward Managed Care is Unpopular, Survey Finds,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1997, at 25 (describing poll that indicates "accelerating levels of dis-
satisfaction" from the previous year).
100. Kurt Eichenwald, Columbia/HCA Inquiry is Said to Produce Evidence of Fraud,
N.Y. TIMEs, July 18, 1997, at C1. Note though, that the greatest instances of fraud oc-
curred not within managed care, but rather fee-for-service arrangements. See Kurt
Eichenwald, Hospital Chain Cheated U.S. on Expenses, Documents Show, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 18, 1997, at 1.
101. See Kurt Eichenwald, Some in Congress Seek to Curb Inquiries into Fraudulent
Billing By Teaching Hospitals, N.Y. TiMES, July 3, 1997, at A14 (suggesting "clumsy gov-
ernment wording of the rules" is responsible for much of the problem).
102. BELL & O'CONNELL, supra note 91, at 192.
103. See, e.g., Saundra Torry, As Managed-Care Plans Proliferate, So Do Lawsuits,
WASH. POST, Mar. 24, 1997, at E3 (reprinting Washington Post advertisement that asks in
bold print "Are You an H.M.O. Victim?"); see also Sam Allis et al., HMO Backlash, TIME,
Apr. 14, 1997, at 33 (reporting a radio advertisement that stated over the sound of a heart
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tion of most health care providers with managed carea° 4-both those in-
cluded and excluded from such plans-creates an "infinitely expanded
bank of expert witnesses not only willing but eager to testify against"
HMOs." °5 Consider, too, the plaintiff's advantage in replacing the indi-
vidual physician as the ultimate defendant with a faceless, deep-pocket,
cost-cutting corporation.' 0 6 It will likely be far easier to prove neligence
in a corporate decision denying medical care than it currently is to prove
that an individual physician's actual treatment was, in fact, negligent.10 7
Malpractice actions against HMOs are also likely to increase because
procedural bars are slowly eroding. Historically, a plaintiff suing an em-
ployer-sponsored HMO faced a substantial impediment under the Em-
ployee Retirement and Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), a
comprehensive federal act regulating employment-provided pension and
benefit:s programs.108 Since its inception, courts have more or less con-
sistently ruled that ERISA preempted any state regulation of, or claim
arising from, such a plan. 10 9
While state medical malpractice plaintiffs have a wide variety of poten-
tial tort remedies available, plaintiffs preempted by ERISA are limited to
"carefully integrated civil enforcement provisions. '"110 For instance, if an
HMO were negligently to deny coverage for a $100 blood test, and
monitor "this used to be the sound that mattered in determining your health care," fol-
lowed by the sound of a cash register ringing and the words "today, this is the sound that
matters," and then supplied a toll-free number to call "if you've been a victim of when
profits come before patients").
104. See generally Survey Probes Doctors' Views on Managed Care, MED. LIABILrTY
MONITOR, Jan. 24, 1997, at 1 (reporting that 65 percent of California physicians viewed the
impact of managed care on their practice as "negative," and reporting the comments of one
physician who stated that "managed care has cut my income, upped my paperwork, inter-
fered with doctor-patient relationships, and demoralized my staff").
105. BELL & O'CONNELL, supra note 91, at 192-93.
106. See Robert Pear, HMOs Using Federal Law to Deflect Malpractice Suits, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 17, 1996, A24 (quoting HMO attorney Peter M. Roan, who noted that the
physicians within HMOs were always potential defendants for malpractice claims but that
plaintiffs want to include HMOs because they represent "another source of money").
107. See generally BELL & O'CONNELL, supra note 91, at 193.
108. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988).
109. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988) (ERISA "shall supersede any and all State laws insofar
as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan"); see also Pilot Life Ins.
Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 46 (1987) (interpreting the preemption in "deliberately ex-
pansive" terms). See also Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 1997).
110. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146 (1985) (limiting re-
covery to contractual damages-including monetary losses, restitution and equitable relief,
but not including compensatory or punitive damages); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2)
(1988); and Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, 508 U.S. 248, 251 (1993).
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$100,000 in injuries resulted, the plaintiff's recovery is limited to $100."l
Federal courts have repeatedly and unapologetically noted that the plain-
tiff's inability to obtain satisfactory relief is irrelevant to their preemption
analysis.'1 2 Courts, instead, note that liability would cause "catastrophic
increases in the cost of employer-sponsored health care benefits, [and
perhaps restrict access to these benefits] contrary to the intent of
Congress.""
3
ERISA protects "fiduciaries" from negligence actions, but does not af-
ford any protection to "providers.""' 4 Generally, a fiduciary administers
the health care plan, while a provider supplies the health care itself." 5
Cost-containment measures, which determine the type and the amount of
treatment that a patient will receive, blur the previously clear distinction
between "fiduciaries" and "providers." If a court defines an HMO as a
fiduciary, it effectively renders it immune from Anders' "spotlight of tort
liability.""' 6 Conversely, if an HMO is considered a provider, then it is
exposed to more substantial state tort remedies. Predictably, Anders ar-
gues that HMOs are really "providers," not "fiduciaries," and that ER-
ISA-provided immunity for HMOs was unintended and is unwarranted,
leaving HMOs "essentially blameless for odious mistakes.""17 Many
traditional health care providers agree. Dr. Ted Lewers, a trustee of the
American Medical Association, says that "if you're going to be involved
in medical decisions ... you should be held accountable. '11 8
The preemption defense appears vulnerable." 9 The Supreme Court
111. Stephanie Anderson Forest, Revenge of the HMO Patients, Bus. WK., Mar. 17,
1997, at 30.
112. See, e.g., Cannon v. Group Health Serv. of Okla., 77 F.3d 1270, 1274 (10th Cir.
1996) cert. denied __ U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 66, 136 L.Ed.2d 27 (1996) (noting that the plaintiff's
predicament was "not germane to preemption analysis"); see also Corcoran v. United
HealthCare, Inc., 965 F.2d. 1321 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1033 (1992).
113. Pear, supra note 106, at A3.
114. See generally Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
115. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(a) (1988); see also Mertens, 508 U.S. at 521.
116. ANDERS, supra note 1, at 256.
117. Id. at 255.
118. Forest, supra note 111, at 30.
119. See, e.g., Havighurst, supra note 22, at 611 (noting that:
without legal accountability for quality, [HMOs] . . .may go far less than effi-
ciency would dictate in integrating the delivery of care with its financing, leaving
the health care revolution incomplete. In taking responsibility for (and seemingly
profiting from) cost control while denying legal responsibility for quality, [HMOs]
also do little to diminish public skepticism concerning their dedication to patient
welfare).
See also id. at 639-40 (HMOs
must truly integrate their doctors into their health plans, taking real responsibility
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invited an erosion of the preemption doctrine when it noted that "run-of-
the-mill state law claims.., or even torts committed by an ERISA plan"
are nct preempted. 120 Accepting the Court's apparent invitation, lower
courts increasingly allow recovery against negligent HMOs.121 Courts
may premise recovery upon an HMO's vicarious liability,122 "ostensible
"123 44 "124 breaagency," corporate negligence, and breach of contract claims. 25
Several federal appeals courts have agreed with Anders' reasoning and
directly questioned the wisdom of any preemption that grants HMOs im-
munity. 126 Similarly, then Secretary of Labor Robert Reich has called
federal preemption "absurd," and invited Congress to "clear the muddied
waters." 27 At least three state legislatures have undertaken challenges
to the preemption of state law claims.
128
for the services provided, and no longer [act] ... merely as cost controllers. Qnce
thi; crucial step is taken, liability law should have a more beneficial impact on the
medical care industry, correcting incongruities inherited from the past and per-
mitting the public to enjoy in relative safety the efficiencies of corporate medical
care).
See also Deborah Gesensway, The Struggle to Hold HMOs Liable, AMERICAN COLLEGE
OF PHYSICIANS OBSERVER, June 1997, at 1; see also David L. Coleman, Will Health Plans
Keep Their ERISA Shield?, MANAGED CARE, May 1997, at 25.
120. Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency and Servs., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 833 (1988).
121. See Jane Bryant Quinn, Prognosis is Poor on Suits Against HMOs, WASH. POST,
June 1, 1997, at H2.
122. See, e.g., Elsesser v. Hospital of the Phila. College of Osteopathic Med., 795
F.Supp, 142, 146-47 (E.D. Pa. 1992), reconsidered, 802 F.Supp. 966 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
123. See, e.g., Independence HMO, Inc. v. Smith, 733 F.Supp. 983, 988-89 (E.D. Pa.
1990).
124. See, e.g., Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253 (Ill.
1965).
125. See, e.g., Dunn v. Praiss, 656 A.2d 413 (N.J. 1985).
126. See, e.g., Corcoran v. United HealthCare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1338-39 (5th Cir.
1992), cert denied, 506 U.S. 1033 (1992) (acknowledging that "fundamental changes such as
the widespread institution of utilization review would seem to warrant a reevaluation of
ERISA so that it can continue to serve its noble purpose of safeguarding the interests of
employees").
127. See Pear, supra note 106, at A3.
128. See, e.g., Texas Civ. Prac. & Rem. §§ 88.002. Florida Governor Lawton Chiles
vetoed similar legislation crafted by the Academy of Florida trial lawyers in 1996 on the
grounds that health insurance rates would soar absent immunity. 1995 Fla. Laws ch.CS/
hB185$. See Gady A. Epstein, Chiles Weighs HMO Suit Bill, TAMPA TRIB., May 24, 1996,
at B1; see also Darryl Van Duch, HMO Liability Laws May Hit Roadblocks, NAT'L L.J.,
June 23, 1997, at B1 (describing legality of New York and Texas initiatives). Republican
Congressman Charlie Norwood of Georgia reports that a majority of House members have
co-sponsored a bill incorporated into federal legislation labeled the "Patients' Bill of
Rights," which would strip HMOs of their ERISA protection. Gil Klein, HMO Operations
Face Cloudy Future, CHARLOTTESVILLE DAILY PROGRESS, Dec. 14, 1997, at A2. Certainly
attempts to amend ERISA so as to allow more common law malpractice suits against
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Even if courts fail to directly challenge the ERISA preemption, they
may grant state causes of action on another ground-the ERISA "savings
clause.' 129 This clause gives the state exclusive control to regulate any
aspect of the "business of insurance."' 3 ° Normally, any matter directly
related to the explicit terms of an insurance contract is considered an
aspect of the "business of insurance" and may be regulated or adjudi-
cated by a state. As HMOs more explicitly incorporate cost-containment
policies into health insurance plans, courts may be more likely to consider
them an aspect of the "business of insurance," thus satisfying ERISA's
savings clause, and thereby negating ERISA's exemption from state
law.
1 3 1
The possible vulnerability of the ERISA preemption and widespread
criticism of managed care leads to the specter of increased malpractice
litigation against HMOs. 132 Ironically, the American Medical Associa-
tion, historically a consistently vocal critic of the tort system, is attacking
the ERISA exemption provided to HMOs in an effort to deflect tort ac-
tions away from its member-physicians. 33 But because the current tort
system so inadequately both compensates victims and deters providers,
the addition of numerous and substantial malpractice claims against
HMOs makes it even more necessary to examine alternatives to the cur-
rent tort system rather than simply aiming a costly and arbitrary tort law
toward new targets.13 4 The remainder of this Article deals with several
alternative regimes.
HMOs will face the same kind of vigorous opposition from employers and HMOs that face
fundamental changes in other cost-containment features of HMOs.
129. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (b)(2)(A) (1988).
130. See generally Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 485 U.S. 119 (1982).
131. Id.
132. Pear, supra note 106, at A3 (citing a study by the physician-owned Medical Insur-
ance Exchange of California that predicted "a flood of future litigation against managed
care organizations, especially large ones with deep pockets" if the preemption were to
erode). For a further discussion of the likelihood of malpractice claims against HMOs
stemming from the changes in health care delivery wrought by HMOs, see BELL &
O'CONNELL, supra note 91, at 191-94 (suggesting the greater ease of proving wrongful
denial of treatment compared to surgical error, coupled with a new pool of plaintiffs' ex-
pert witnesses in the form of physicians bitterly disenchanted with HMOs).
133. AMA Says Dump ERISA Liability Shield, MED. LIABILITY MONITOR, Apr. 19,
1997, at 3. For the view that erosion of HMO's ERISA exemption would harm individual
practitioners by providing HMOs even greater incentive to wrest control of medical deci-
sions from providers (in an effort to avoid the liability erosion of ERISA would expose
them to), see What's the Downside to Cutting ERISA Immunity? MED. LIABILITY MONI-
TOR, July 14, 1997, at 1.
134. Id.
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IV. ALTERNATIVE REGIMES TO ADDRESS HMO MALPRACTICE
This portion of the Article is intended to demonstrate that "no-fault"
malpractice insurance and legislative regulation of the managed care in-
dustry will not satisfactorily accommodate increased litigation against
HMOs.
A. No-Fault Compensation
Under a "no-fault" compensation regime, defendants would provide
claimants, regardless of fault, with compensation. No-fault schemes com-
pensate victims more quickly and consistently than does the traditional
tort system, and at a lower cost. No-fault regimes have worked well in
other contexts-most notably automobile insurance and workers' com-
pensation. 135 Several commentators have suggested that no-fault com-
pensat'ion be expanded to medical malpractice claims.' 36  Both
Virginia 137 and Florida13 have instituted very limited "no-fault" regimes
for claims arising from birth-induced neurological injuries. However,
their effectiveness is much debated.' 39 Even staunch advocates of no-
fault compensation acknowledge that medical malpractice presents
unique difficulties for a no-fault regime. 4 °
Cormparing a person's physical health prior to an automobile or indus-
trial accident, and determining which injuries were caused by that acci-
dent is relatively easy. Normally, all the accident victim's injuries are
demonstrably caused by the workplace or auto accident itself. Medical
malpractice victims are, however, in a very different situation. Prior to
sufferiag any negligently inflicted injury, most suffer from a condition se-
rious emough to warrant complicated treatment or invasive surgery.
Many would suffer some lingering infirmity, regardless of whether their
135. See O'CONNELL & KELLY, supra note 61, at 131; and see generally Jeffrey
O'Connell et al., The Comparative Costs of Allowing Consumer Choice for Auto Insurance
in All Fifty States, 55 MD. L. REV. 160 (1996) (reporting favorable economic studies of no-
fault aut:omobile insurance plans).
136. See, e.g., Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 558
(1985); Tancredi, supra note 71, at 277.
137. See VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5000, et seq. (Michie Supp. 1990).
138. See FLA. STAT. § 766.301, et seq. (1997).
139. See Richard A. Epstein, Market and Regulatory Approaches to Medical Malprac-
tice: The Virginia Obstetrical No-Fault Statute, 74 VA. L. REV. 1451 (1988); see also Jeffrey
O'Connell, Pragmatic Constraints on Market Approaches: A Response to Professor Epstein,
74 VA. L. REV. 1475 (1988); see also Mary A. Cavanaugh, Note, Bad Cures for Bad Babies:
Policy Challenges to the Statutory Removal of the Common Law Claim for Birth-Related
Neurological Injuries, 43 CASE W. L. REV. 1299 (1993).
140. Randall, supra note 3, at 78.
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health care providers were negligent. Most complicated treatment (and
all invasive surgery) necessarily produces subsequent "injuries," even ab-
sent negligence. It is therefore necessary to distinguish between the inju-
ries caused by negligent treatment, and those caused by the "presenting
complaint," which are simply unavoidably attendant to medical treat-
ment.' 4 ' This problem of causation is an inhibiting factor in applying no-
fault compensation plans to medical malpractice. 42 Medical malpractice,
therefore, presents unmanageably complex questions of causation to a
system designed primarily for administrative simplicity, not analytical
subtlety. In addition, because so few adverse consequences of medical
treatment are now covered by medical malpractice litigation, a no-fault
compensation scheme might well be prohibitively expensive.143
B. Regulatory Legislation
In response to the kind of tales Anders tells, governmental regulation
of HMOs is increasing.144 Most legislative efforts so far are piecemeal
reactions addressing one small, though objectionable, cost-containment
measure. 145 While tempted to take aim at the "rougher edges" of man-
141. O'CONNELL & KELLY, supra note 61, at 128-29.
142. RICHARD EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD (1995). For an ex-
haustive study regarding the feasibility of no-fault insurance applicable to medical maloc-
currences, see Harvard Medical Malpractice Study, supra note 52. This study seems to
suggest that a true no-fault scheme may be feasible but further research is needed. For a
skeptical view, see A. Russell Localio et al., Relation Between Malpractice Claims and Ad-
verse Events Due to Negligence, 325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 245 (1991). For a more optimistic
view, see Paul Weiler et al., Proposal for Medical Liability Reform, 267 JAMA 2355 (1992).
143. See Harvard Medical Malpractice Study, supra note 52; see also Localio, supra note
142, at 245.
144. For the view that governmental curbs on HMOs negatively affect the quality, ac-
cess, and cost of health care, see RICHARD EPSTEIN, MORTAL PERIL (1997). For the view
that the federal government should regulate emergency care provided by HMOs, see Di-
ane E. Hoffmann, Emergency Care and Managed Care-A Dangerous Combination, 72
WASH. L. REV. 315 (1997). For an example of a troublesome cost-containment policy, see
David S. Hilzenrath, The Life-Savers' Dilemma, WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 1998, at D1 (describ-
ing "medlining" riskier patients out of coverage). For a vigorous and rigorous defense of
the corrective nature of HMOs in curbing the excesses of fee-for-service medicine, and an
equally vigorous and rigorous attack on governmental attempts by legislation or regulation
to curb the operations of HMOs, including expansion of tort liability thereof, see Patricia
Danzon, Tort Liability: A Minefield for Managed Care, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 491 (1997).
145. Typical are "more than two dozen bills" regulating HMOs introduced in the 1996
Maryland General Assembly critically referred to as "legislation by anecdote" or "legisla-
tion by body part." Terry M. Neal, HMOs Feel the Heat in Maryland Fight Over Regula-
tion, WASH. POST, Mar. 1997, at B1. See also, David S. Hilzenrath, Backlash Builds Over
Managed Care, WASH. POST, June 30, 1997, at Al; Milt Fruedenheim, Pioneering State for
Managed Care Fights for Change: California Thinks Again, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1997, at
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aged care, politicians may be unlikely to impose any sweeping reform to
vitiate cost-containment policies; nor will employers likely tolerate it if
politicians were so inclined.146 Politicians may well focus on vote-winning
strategies that regulate only the most objectionable cost-containment pol-
icies of HMOs.'4 7 The most notable example of legislative intervention is
mandating forty-eight hour maternity stays instead of one-day "drive-
through deliveries."' 48 Recently, the President's Advisory Commission
on Consumer Protection and Quality in the Health Care Industry has
promulgated a more comprehensive "Patient's Bill of Rights." '149 In an
effort to bolster flagging consumer confidence, even some HMOs have
called for increased governmental regulation.'50
But politicians may well be unlikely to impose wholesale reforms upon
the managed care industry.' 5' Not only may politicians be reluctant to
curtail the cost-containment policies of HMOs because they are depen-
dent upon managed care to control expenses in entitlement programs like
Medicare and Medicaid, 52 but also because the managed care industry-
not to speak of the employers that utilize it-is extremely influential po-
Al. See also Passell, supra note 94, at 1 (arguing that "more government intervention than
the insurance industry wants and less than the center-left had hoped for ... [o]r, to put it
another way: Hillary Lite" is likely to occur).
146. Health Care Heavies, supra note 42, at A20.
147. See, e.g., Hilzenrath, supra note 145, at Al (detailing varying legislative efforts to
curb perceived ills of managed care while preserving its fundamental character).
148. ANDERS, supra note 1, at 212.
149. See Laurie McGinley, Broad Battle to End HMOs Limited Liability for Treat-
ment-Coverage Denial Gains Steam, WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 1998, at A22. See also Laurie
McGinl-y, Clinton is Poised to Endorse Prescription By Panel on How to Improve Health
Care, WALL ST. J., Oct. 21, 1997, at B19. Political support for the proposal, however, is
uncertain at best. See, e.g., Robert Pear, Move Under Way to Try to Block Health Care
Bills, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1997, at Al; see also Richard Armey, Socialized Medicine on the
Installment Plan, WALL ST. J., Nov. 17, 1997, at A26. The political battles are obviously far
from settled. For excellent coverage of the most recent developments in this regard, see
generally articles written by Robert Pear and Kurt Eichenwald of the New York Times.
150. See Robert Pear, 3 Big Health Plans Urge National Standards, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
25, 1997, at Al.
151. But see Jonathan Rabinovitz, Connecticut Votes to Restrict Denials under Managed
Care, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1997, at Al (describing legislation that creates independent
governmental review of HMOs' denials of coverage).
152. Burgess, supra note 45, at 291-92; see also Robert Pear, Congress Weighs More
Regulat .on on Managed Care, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1997, at Al (discussing "Congress'
love-hate relationship with managed care. Policy makers want to inject additional man-
aged care into Medicare and Medicaid ... [b]ut at the same time, they react to each new
horror ;tory by mandating new benefits"). See also Peter T. Kilbozn, In Managed Care,
"Consuner" Laws Benefit Doctors: Patients Seen as Losing, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1998, at
Al (indicating that laws mandating benefits are designed to preserve doctors' income and
turf more than patients' needs).
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litically.1 53 In 1994, the insurance industry became the largest corporate
donor to political campaigns.
154
Because no-fault compensation presents such substantial causation
problems and because comprehensive political regulation of managed
care seems politically, and arguably economically,155 untenable, the tort
system's efforts at compensation and internalization for negligent health
care-even if inadequate-cannot be entirely abandoned. However, the
tort system can be modified and its best features preserved for many mal-
practice claimants. A better system would strongly encourage settle-
ments by health care providers, including HMOs, that fully and quickly
compensate malpractice claimants for their actual economic losses, con-
tinue to deter negligent providers, and yet decrease the transaction costs
of the current tort system. The next section of this Article details such a
plan.
V. THE PROMISE OF "EARLY OFFERS"
Senator Mitch McConnell (R-KY) introduced the Legal Reform and
Consumer Compensation Act of 1996156 to replace a "mess-of-a-legal sys-
tem" with "reforms that will ensure those who are injured get fairly and
quickly compensated without resort to expensive and protracted litiga-
tion., 157 Similar provisions applicable to federally funded health care re-
cipients were introduced a decade ago by Congressman Richard
Gephardt (D-MO). 15 s This proposed legislation would equip any civil
defendant, including health care providers, and, in turn HMOs, with the
option of offering a payment to a claimant within 120 days of an adverse
medical occurrence covering all medical expenses, wage losses not paid
by collateral sources, plus reasonable attorneys' fees.159 It would, in
other words, compensate eligible claimants for all of their net economic
losses but not for noneconomic losses such as pain and suffering. The
153. ANDERS, supra note 1, at 210 (calling MCOs' "the best lobbyists in America" and
noting that managed care companies pay lobbying firms to generate what appears to be
"grassroots" opposition to legislation, but should more accurately be termed "astroturf
lobbying").
154. Id. at 214.
155. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
156. See S. 1861, 104th Cong. 2nd Sess. (1996).
157. 142 Cong. Rec. S6082, S6096, 104th Cong., 2nd Sess., June 11, 1996.
158. H.R. 5400, 98th Cong. (1984), and H.R. 3084, 99th Cong. (1985). For discussion,
see W. Henson Moore & John S. Hoff, H.R. 3084: A More Rational Compensation System
for Medical Malpractice, 49 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 117 (1986).
159. S. 1861, 104th Cong. 2nd Sess. (1996).
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claimant would receive periodic payments as losses accrued, resulting in
more accurate compensation than does the lump-sum payment of the
present system 161 (though admittedly at the risk of increased malinger-
ing).' 6 ' In return for this "early offer," claimants would be required to
surrender their tort remedies. Claimants could always reject such an of-
fer and retain their ability to bring a tort suit, but would then be forced to
prove, by a heightened burden of proof (clear and convincing evidence
rather than the current preponderance of the evidence standard), a lower
standard of care (intentional or wanton misconduct rather than mere neg-
ligence).' 62 Note, the defendant would always have the option of not
making an early offer, in which case the claimant could resort to a stan-
dard tort action.
"Ea:rly offer" legislation represents a significant advantage over most
reform measures that simply limit the claimant's potential recovery, typi-
cally by capping pain and suffering damages and contingent fees or by
eliminating joint and several liability.' 63 By addressing the over-compen-
sation problem alone, these latter "reforms" unfairly favor only one party
to the litigation 64 and improperly weaken the deterrent effect of tort
law.165 Although the early offer plan, by eliminating noneconomic dam-
ages and deducting for collateral sources, insulates potential defendants
from exposure to tort's nearly limitless liability, it should retain the deter-
rent effect of the tort system by requiring prompt payment of all eco-
nomic losses as a prerequisite for any relief from tort liability. Because
claimants benefit from speedier compensation for economic losses with-
out reduction for contingent attorneys' fees, early offers also address the
under-compensation problem for claimants. The system provides both
parties a quid pro quo166 and limits reliance upon the cumbersome tort
system to resolve only the most egregious cases of negligence or spurious
160. Periodic payments might well be accomplished by requiring that the defendant
purchase an annuity on behalf of the claimant.
161. See generally Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV.
237, 270 (1996).
162. 142 Cong. Rec. S6082, S6103, 104th Cong., 2nd Sess, June 11, 1996.
163. See, e.g., H.R. 956, 104th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1996) (limiting noneconomic damages
to $250,000 in any medical malpractice action).
164. Some "reforms" of this one-sided sort have even been declared unconstitutional.
See, e.g., Morris v. Savoy, 576 N.E.2d 765 (Ohio 1991).
165, O'Connell, supra note 92, at 1309.
166. Arguably at least, such a quid pro quo is constitutionally required. See generally
New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917); see also Boyd v. Bulala, 647 F.Supp.
781 (W.D. Va. 1986).
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claims. It also allows both parties to escape the often daunting experi-
ence of an adversarial trial.
Critics may argue that an early offer system provides less deterrence
than does the traditional tort liability system; that unless health care
providers, including HMOs, are threatened with heavy tort judgments,
they will not refrain from negligent practices. But importantly, claimants
may elect to retain their tort action, preserving the threat of tort liability
for what Anders cites as the most egregious instances of malpractice.
Providers, therefore, face very real threats of potential liability under an
early offer system, not to mention the obligation, when early offers are
made, of guaranteeing their patients' net economic losses.
Additionally, early offer "defendants" may be prompted to make an
early offer in more cases than they would currently lose in tort litigation.
One defense attorney hypothesizes that he would make early offers to
pay for economic losses in two hundred of the two hundred and fifty
cases his office was currently defending, certainly higher than the number
he would expect to lose in tort litigation.' 67 While few early offers would
likely equal the size of the tort system's more substantial verdicts, the
increase in paid-claim frequency may offset the typically smaller judg-
ments, and still impose very substantial costs on a defendant.
Several other deterrent factors warrant mention. Early offers would
impose a swifter exaction on the HMO, chronologically linking injury and
payment much more proximately than tort liability.' 6  Additionally, the
"early offer" legislation does not, by any means, eliminate reputational
and other extra-judicial deterrents upon providers. 169 Because the early
offer system compensates only for actual economic losses, some injured
claimants (for example, the elderly, homemakers, the unemployed, or
those with very ample collateral sources) may not be entitled to substan-
tial payment. Thus, compensation for economic losses alone could under-
deter the defendant in the event one of these individuals were injured. A
simple solution would impose a minimum amount, or floor, of say
$250,000 to which all early offers covering serious injuries would be sub-
ject. Despite these substantial advantages, early offers, like any large-
scale tort reform, is likely to engender substantial opposition from some
distinct (and vocal) sectors. Most notably, the trial bar and consumer
167. O'CONNELL & KELLY, supra note 61, at 133.
168. Id. at 134.
169. Moore & O'Connell, supra note 68, at 1286 (citing the "professional pride, the
opinion and review of one's peers, and the fear of adverse publicity" as effective deter-
rents). Indeed in this connection, see supra note 145 and accompanying text.
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groups have historically opposed efforts to substantially reform our tort
system. 170 But consumer groups might note that, although early offer
awards will be lower than tort recoveries, because the claimant's transac-
tion costs are reduced and attorney's fees are paid by the insurer on top
of economic loss, the claimant may, in real dollars, recover above the
level of the tort system,'17 1 not to speak of doing so more promptly.
Providers' associations, notably the American Medical Association and
the trade associations of managed care groups, may object to early offers
because they fear the reputational ramification of any settlement offer.
172
However, defendants retain complete discretion to extend the offer. If
defendants desire to avoid any stigma associated with an early offer, they
retain the ability to contest any tort claim. In this connection, though, an
early offer settlement is intended to be less acrimonious than litigation,




In Health Against Wealth, George Anders understandably, if
overzealously, focuses on the injuries that HMOs' cost-containment poli-
cies may cause. Despite his animadversions, HMOs seem here to stay.
Even so, public criticism of cost-containment policies coupled with the
erosion of ERISA-provided immunity may well result in a dramatic in-
crease in the incidence of malpractice claims against HMOs. And yet the
current malpractice system is monumentally ineffective as both a com-
pensatory and deterrent mechanism. At the same time, problems of cau-
sation seem to preclude no-fault compensation as an efficient malpractice
alterna:ive, while political and economic realties make wholesale regula-
tion of HMOs equally unlikely.
174
170. See King, supra note 64, at 228 (describing the "fierce opposition of American
negligence lawyers" to no-fault automobile insurance).
171. Randall, supra note 3, at 76.
172. The Health Care Improvement Act of 1996 (P.L. 99-660) established a National
Practitioner Data Bank that records every malpractice judgment or settlement against a
provider. See generally United States Department of Health and Human Services, Health
Resources and Services Administration, Bureau of Health Professions, Division of Quality
Assurance, National Practitioners' Data Bank: 1995 Annual Report, Rockville, Maryland,
1996. Inreasingly, consumer groups are demanding access to the data bank. See States
Increase Access to Physician Data, HEALTH LEGIS. & REG. WEEKLY, Apr. 9, 1997.
173. Tancredi, supra note 71, at 279 (arguing that the same is true of some no-fault
compensation reforms).
174. See BELL & O'CONNELL, supra note 91, at 253 n.3.
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An early offer system, in contrast, reflects the wisdom of avoiding liti-
gation costs, while at the same time deterring negligent health care prov-
iders-including HMOs-and encouraging immediate payment to
injured patients. 175 It offers prompt compensation for actual economic
losses to many more victims than does the tort system with dramatically
lower transaction costs. Because of these clear advantages, the early offer
system should be a marked improvement over our current tort system
and represents a prudent reform in light of the likelihood of more numer-
ous tort actions against HMOs and other managed care providers.1
76
175. For a discussion of the early offer proposal as serving to correct the evils of false
positives and false negatives, while still internalizing adverse results for health care, see
Jeffrey O'Connell, Two Tier Tort Law: Neo No-Fault & Quasi-Criminal Liability, 27 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 871 (1992).
176. A thorough review of all major proposals to deal with medical malpractice litiga-
tion concludes that only the early offer approach offers a realistic hope for prompt cure to
the major ills of such litigation. Tan, supra note 59, at 273-74. See also Havighurst, supra
note 22, at 645 (inviting "alternatives to ... tort law that would represent major improve-
ments in the welfare of everyone concerned-everyone, that is, except trial lawyers and
malpractice insurers").
